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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case NO.960746-CA

vs.
CHARLOTTE MARLENE LONGSHAW,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

B R I E F OF APPELLANT

LONGSHAW

JURISDICTION

This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s m a t t e r p u r s u a n t

to

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (j) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in
Denying the Defendant's Motion for New Trial on
the Basis that the Statements Made by the
Prosecution During Closing Arguments were
Substantial and Prejudicial to the Extent that
there is a Reasonable Likelihood that in their
Absence There Would Have Been a More Favorable
Result.

Standard

of Review:

In determining whether or not a

statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct:
The statement must be viewed in light of the
totality of the evidence presented at trial.

Further, because the trial court is in the best
position to determine the impact of a statement upon
the proceedings, its rulings on whether the
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
State

v.

Cummins,

839 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992).

Preservation in Trial Court: This matter was preserved in
the trial court upon objection of defense counsel during the
State's closing argument. (R. at 001651).
II.

There Was Insufficient Evidence Upon Which to
Convict the Defendant of Criminal Homicide,
Murder, a First Degree Felony.

Standard of Review: When examining the sufficiency of the
evidence

in a criminal

jury trial the threshold

issue of

statutory interpretation is decided as a matter of law.
State

v.

Souza,

See

846 P.2d at 1313 (Utah App. 1993). With regard

to the facts, the evidence and all inferences which may be
reasonably

drawn

from

it are

reviewed

in the

light most

favorable to the verdict of the jury. This Court will review
a conviction when the evidence, viewed in light of the court's
interpretation of the statute, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently

improbable

that

reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which she was convicted. See State
821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992).

2

v.

Johnson,

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Determinative case law in this matter includes: State
Utah

v.

Cummins,

839 P.2d 848 (Ut. App. 1992) which discusses

the matter of prosecutorial misconduct and State
Padilla,

776

definition

of

P.2d

1329

of mental

(Utah

state

1989)

which

of

Utah

discusses

for manslaughter

and

v.
the

voluntary

intoxication.
Determinative statutes include Utah
which

sets

forth

the elements

Code

Ann.

§ 7 6-5-203

for first degree murder

and

states in pertinent part that:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the
actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death
of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to
another commits an act clearly dangerous to
human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another
and
thereby
causes
the
death
of
another;. . •
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 76-5-205 sets forth the definition for

manslaughter and reads in pertinent part that:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if
the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; or
(b) causes the death of another under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for
which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse; or

3

(c)causes
the
death
of
another
under
circumstances
where
the
actor
reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a legal
justification
or excuse
for his
conduct
although the conduct is not legally justifiable
or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional disturbance
does not include a condition resulting from mental
illness as defined in Section 76-2-305.
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse
under Subsection (1)(b), or the reasonable belief of
the actor under Subsection
(1) (c) , shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person
under the then existing circumstances.
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 7 6-5-207 sets forth the elements for the

crime of negligent homicide and states that:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide
if the actor, acting with criminal negligence,
causes the death of another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ms. Longshaw, the appellant, was charged with one count
of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony on or
about April 10, 1995. The charge arose from actions that took
place at the Memorial Estates Funeral Home at 6500 South 1700
West in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on that same day. Ms
Longshaw was attending

the

funeral of her brother, Aaron

Greuber, when a fight broke out between Terry D. Stewart, and
Ms.

Longshaw's

brother,

John

4

Sloan. Ms. Longshaw

was

in

possession of a firearm which she took out in trying to end
the fight. One shot was fired which resulted in the death of
Terry D. Stewart- As the evidence at trial showed, and as will
be discussed in greater detail below, at the time of the
incident Ms. Longshaw had been taking Valium and Soma in
rather

large

quantities

and

was

suffering

from

extreme

emotional distress.
This matter went to trial on or about May 21, 1996. This
matter was tried to a jury and a verdict of guilty of Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, was handed down on or
about May 30, 1996. Ms. Longshaw was sentenced before the
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki on or about July 22, 1996. She was
sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to life at
the Utah State Prison. She was further ordered to pay full
restitution.
filed

(R. at 000211) . A timely Notice of Appeal was

in this matter on or about

July 30, 1996.

(R. at

000213).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about April 10, 1995 Ms. Longshaw was charged with
one count of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony.
(R. at 000008). These charges arose out of actions that took
place that same day at the Memorial Estates Funeral Home at
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6500 South 1700 West in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The
funeral that was taking place that day was for Ms. Longshaw's
brother, Aaron Greuber. Aaron had died on April 3, 1995. (R.
at 001094). Mr. Greuber's death was discovered when his wife,
Terresa Greuber called Ms. Longshaw's mother, Dorothy Greuber
and asked if she had seen Aaron. (R. at 001095). Terresa and
Aaron had been fighting and Terresa was not staying with Aaron
at the time. (Id.) After the call, Mrs. Greuber asked her
daughter Marlene Longshaw, the defendant/appellant to go by
Aaron's home and check on him. When Marlene went to check on
her brother she found him lying on the floor dead. (Id.)
Over the course of the next few days the family began to
make funeral arrangements. During this time period there was
a lot of animosity between Terresa Greuber and Aaron Greuber's
family.

Aaron's

family

felt

that

Terresa

may

have

had

something to do with Aaron's death and there were numerous
antagonistic
initial

phone

period.

arrangements,

calls between

(R.

Daniel

at

the parties

001257).

Hernandez,

In
the

initially contacted Dorothy Greuber.
Greuber

immediately

turned

the

making

during
the

funeral

this

funeral

director,

(R. at 000278). Mrs.

arrangements

over

to

the

appellant, Marlene. (Id.) During this initial contact, Mr.
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Hernandez discovered that Aaron was married and he informed
the Greuber family that Aaron's wife was the person he should
be

speaking

with. Marlene

informed

Mr. Hernandez

of

the

conflict that was present between the families and that if
they were to make the arrangements they did not want Terresa
present while the arrangements were being made.(R. at 000279).
Mr. Hernandez then contacted Terresa Greuber and made an
appointment with her to begin making arrangements. (Id.) In
speaking with Terresa, Mr. Hernandez was informed that she did
not want Aaron's family involved and that she wanted to make
the arrangements

herself. However,

she also

informed Mr.

Hernandez that she did not have the money for the funeral and
she wanted the Greuber's to pay for it. (R. at 000280-81).
When Hernandez informed Terresa that if the Greuber's were to
pay

for the funeral she could not leave them out of it,

Terresa

said

she

would

find

another

way

to

pay.

(Id.)

Ultimately, Terresa was unable to pay for the funeral and she
decided to allow the Greuber's to make the arrangements and
pay for the funeral. (R. at 000283-84). At this point, Marlene
made all of the funeral arrangements.

Mr. Hernandez testified

that Marlene was the person who attempted to keep the family
under control and to not let the animosity towards Terresa get
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out of hand. She included Terresa in the obituary and never
tried to exclude her from the funeral itself. (R. at 000285).
On Sunday evening, April 9, 1995 a viewing was held at
the

Memorial

Estates

Funeral

Home.

(R.

at

000287).

The

testimony at trial was that the defendant, Marlene Longshaw,
was very distraught and upset at the viewing. More so than she
had ever been in the past. (R. at 001098). Further, according
to Dorothy Greuber, Marlene was taking Valium the night of the
viewing. (Id.) During the viewing, Terresa Greuber showed up
with various members of her family, including her stepfather
Terry Stewart. Mrs. Greuber, along with other members of the
Greuber family reported that Terry Stewart was carrying a gun
under his overcoat that night and that Mrs. Greuber, along
with many of the children and others that attended the viewing
had seen the gun and were-frightened. (R. at 001100, 001379,
001396 and 001425). It was also testified to that when Terry
Stewart approached the coffin of Aaron Greuber he commented
that "he doesn't look so tough now/' (R. at 001352). This
comment was reported to Marlene who was apparently very upset.
(R. at 001353) .
After the viewing as a result of the gun seen on Terry
Stewart and the comments that had been reported,

8

Dorothy

Greuber held a family meeting.

(R. at 001103) . During the

meeting the family discussed how to make sure that everyone
was safe during the funeral. They assigned each child to an
adult so that if there was a problem of any kind the adults
could get the children out of the room. (Id.) They discussed
what had taken place at the viewing, and further, Mrs. Greuber
called the police to report the sighting of the gun at the
viewing. (R. at 001104). The police told her if there was any
further trouble to call back. (R. at 001105). At no time did
any member

of the

family discuss

taking

firearms

to the

funeral. (Id.)
The funeral took place on Monday, April 10, 1995. There
was

testimony

from

various

individuals

that

Marlene

was

terribly distraught at the funeral and her grief exceeded
anything

they

had

ever

seen

before.

The

testimony

was

undisputed that Marlene spent the entire hour prior to the
beginning of the funeral laying on top of the body of her dead
brother Aaron.

(R. at 000298, 001107

& 001225). Further,

Marlene kept telling people at the funeral to "just put me in
with him and close the casket so I can go with him." (R. at
001107 & 001399). The funeral itself was scheduled to begin at
2:00 p.m. (R. at 000287). At approximately ten minutes before
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2:00 the family prayer began. (R. at 000299). As the family
prayer was ending, just prior to the funeral, Terresa Greuber
and her family, including Terry Stewart, and three or four
other

individuals arrived at the funeral.

(R. at 000299,

001225) . After entering the room, Terresa proceeded towards
the casket while the remainder of her family stayed in the
back of the room near the door. (R. at 000305). Just prior to
Terresa approaching the casket, Marlene finally stepped away
from her brother's body. (R. at 000309). It was at this point
that chaos begin to break out in the room. Marlene's daughter
Dorothy Longshaw, who was about fourteen at the time, and
Terresa Greuber began a shouting match which escalated into a
fight between the two women.

(R. at 001227). At this time

shouting began in the back of the room. John Sloan, who is
Marlenefs older brother, turned to Terry Stewart and said "you
got a big mouth". (R. at 000312). Mr. Sloan also said "let's
go out in the parking lot and settle it". (R. at 000313). At
this time a fight broke out between John Sloan and Terry
Stewart.

(R. at 000314). Mr. Stewart was dressed in a long

western type top coat or slicker type rain coat when he
entered the room and was still wearing the coat when the fight
broke out. (Id.) At this point the entire room erupted into a
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fight. (R. at 000316). According to the testimony, Marlene's
mother, Dorothy Greuber somehow got involved in the fight
between John Sloan and Terry Stewart. At one point, Terry
Stewart had Mrs. Greuber in a head lock. (R. at 001230). Lane
Arson, who testified at trial, testified that he broke up the
fight

between

Stewart

and Mrs. Greuber

and

then

Stewart

proceeded to fight again with John Sloan. (Id.) Mr. Lane then
attempted to break up the fight between Stewart and Sloan. (R.
at 001231) .
According

to

the

testimony

of

Daniel

Hernandez, the

funeral director, at this point the room was in total chaos.
"Pictures were flying, flowers were flying, it was chaos.
There was little kids screaming, everybody, I could hardly
hear myself think." (R. at 000317). It was then that Hernandez
saw the defendant, Marlene, standing in the middle of the room
with a gun. (Id.) According to the testimony of Michael Moore,
he saw Marlene with the gun and hollered at her to put it down
to which she responded "I will". (R. at 001357). However, Mr.
Moore testified that Marlene was a mess at this point. He
testified that she was so torn up, that in the twenty years he
had

known her, he had never

001359). Bonnie Thackeray,

seen her

like this.

the assistant
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(R. at

funeral director

testified

that

when

she

saw

Marlene

with

the

gun

she

approached her and said "Marlene". She testified that she was
surprised because Marlene did not seem to know who she was and
did

not

respond

in

any

way.

She

further

testified

that

Marlene's eyes looked glassy and she was moving towards the
fight between her brother and Terry Stewart. (R. at 000506).
She testified that she heard Marlene say "back off" two or
three times and that she appeared to be saying this to Terry
Stewart. (Id.) At this point, Ms. Thackeray testified that she
left the room. (R. at 0005007) . Mr. Arson testified that as he
was

attempting

to

break

up

the

fight

between

Sloan

and

Stewart, Marlene approached them from behind on his left side.
(R. at 001232). He testified that Marlene grabbed a hold of
Terry Stewart's coat and shortly thereafter he heaird a gun
shot and felt the powder or the muzzle blast on his hip. (R.
at 001233). According to Mr. Arson, Marlene was maybe a foot
and a half away from Stewart when the gun went off. (Id.) At
this point Terry Stewart fell to the ground. (Id.)

According

to the testimony of Alicia Patrick, Marlene's sister, after
Terry Stewart fell to the ground his family surrounded him.
She further testified that his wife, Kathy Turnbow, and his
stepson, Troy Turnbow, appeared to be removing things from his
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pockets. After this Troy Turnbow began taking purses and
running out to a truck in the parking lot. (R. at 001409).
Dorothy Greuber also testified that while she was waiting in
the parking lot after the shooting she saw Troy Turnbow run
through the parking lot numerous times with a purse in his
hands and then he would return to the funeral home without it
coming back shortly thereafter with another purse.

(R. at

0001110).
According to Dr. Todd Grey, the medical examiner the
gunshot wound suffered by Mr. Stewart was in the "right lower
lateral chest region" and was classified as an "indeterminate
range wound". (R. at 000748) . He further testified that:
The wound path went through the skin and struck one
of the ribs causing a break in the right 7th rib. It
then perforated the muscles we breathe with, which
is the diaphragm, caused an injury across the top of
the liver, went back through the diaphragm and
struck the right lung more towards the middle of the
chest. It then struck the heart causing a grazing
injury to the back of the heart. It struck the
aorta, which is the major vessel that supplies blood
to our body, went through the left lung and then
passed between the left third and fourth ribs and
came to rest before it could exit the skin.
(R. at 000749). The weapon that Marlene used was a .22 caliber
revolver. (R. at 000786).
Norman Longshaw, Marlene's husband, testified that the
firearm used by Marlene belonged to them. He testified that it
13

was kept locked in the basement and that Marlene had never
carried a gun or even handled one to his knowledge prior to
this day. (R. at 001487). He further testified that he did not
know she had the gun with her at the funeral until he saw her
take it out when the fight broke out. (R. at 001488). After
the shooting Marlene left the funeral home and went to the
parking lot. Mr. Longshaw testified that he waited in the
parking lot with her until the police arrived. While in the
parking lot he asked his wife if she realized what she had
just done and she just looked at him with a blank stare. (R.
at 001489). At this point he just handed her a cigarette.
(Id.)
Shortly thereafter a number of police officers began to
arrive. According to the testimony of Officer Richard Davis
when he arrived at the scene he proceeded inside and saw the
body of Stewart. He then located Terry Stewart's wife, Kathy
Turnbow, and asked who had shot her husband. She told him that
it was Marlene. (R. at 0000882). At this point Officer Davis
went out to the parking lot and began to ask who Marlene was.
Ms. Longshaw raised her hand and said "I'm Marlene".

She then

put out the cigarette, lifted up her shirt and showed him the
revolver sticking out of her pants and said "is this what you
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are looking for?" (R. at 0000883-884). For purposes of safety,
Officer Davis drew his weapon and instructed Marlene to lie
down on the ground. She did this at which point Corporal Tom
Hill arrived and handcuffed her and seized the revolver. (Id.)
According to Officer Davis, Marlene was compliant the entire
time. (R. at 000901).
Ms. Longshaw was arrested and taken to the police station
by

Officer

Dan

Gallagher.

Gallagher

did

gun

interview

Marlene.

shot
(R.

Once

residue
at

at

the

tests

001001,

station

and

Officer

then began

001003).

During

to
the

interview Marlene told him that she had seen a gun the night
before at the viewing. (R. at 001011). She also stated that
when the fight broke out at the funeral between her brother
and Mr. Stewart that she grabbed Mr. Stewart in an attempt to
pull

him away

from her brother.

(R. at

001014).

Officer

Gallagher testified that at this point he did not know the
condition of Mr. Stewart, and Ms. Longshaw did not know that
Stewart was dead.

(R. at 001028). The interview with Ms.

Longshaw continued until Officer Gallagher received a phone
call

from Marlene's counsel requesting that the interview

stop. ( R. at 001077).
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Marlene Longshaw was convicted of the charge of first
degree murder on or about May 30, 1996 and was sentenced to a
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The prosecutor in this matter made statements during the
rebuttal portion of his closing argument which incorrectly
stated

the

law.

In discussing

voluntary

intoxication

the

prosecutor told the jury that if they found the defendant was
voluntarily intoxicated they could not find her guilty of
either manslaughter or negligent homicide. (R. at 0001651-52) .
Defense

counsel objected

to this statement and the court

instructed the jury to follow the jury instructions. However,
after the court's instruction the prosecution again misstated
the law and repeated to the jury that if the defendant was
voluntarily

intoxicated

they

could

not

return verdict of

either manslaughter or negligent homicide.
The statements of the prosecutor in his closing argument
violate the two part test set forth in State

v.

Valdez,

513

P.2d 422 (Utah 1973). The remarks called the attention of the
jurors

to

a matter

that

they would

not be

justified

in

considering in determining their verdict and this error was
substantial and prejudicial to such a degree that there is a
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reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have
been a more favorable result.
There was insufficient evidence in this matter to convict
the defendant of first degree murder. First degree murder is
defined at Utah

Code Ann.

§ 76-5-203 which sets forth the

elements which the state must prove. In order to be convicted
of first degree murder the state must prove that the defendant
acted with either the intent to kill, the intent to commit
serious bodily injury, or depraved indifference. The state did
not prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Rather, the evidence showed overwhelmingly that Ms. Longshaw
was acting under severe emotional distress the day of the
shooting.

It

further

showed

that

she

suffers

from

Post

Traumatic Stress Disorder and on the day of the shooting she
had taken large quantities of Valium and Soma causing her to
be

intoxicated.

This

evidence

supported

a

verdict

of

manslaughter. There was also ample evidence that the defendant
was acting negligently and may have been guilty of negligent
homicide or that she was acting in self defense and was not
guilty of any crime.
The evidence presented in this matter was sufficiently
inconclusive and inherently improbable to such a degree that
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reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
Marlene Longshaw committed the crime of first degree murder.
If the jury would have given proper consideration to the
evidence

in

this

matter

they

could

not

have

reasonably

convicted Ms. Longshaw of first degree murder and therefore
this Court should overturn the verdict of the jury in this
matter.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in
Denying the Defendant's Motion for New Trial on the
Basis that the Statements Made by the Prosecution
During Closing Arguments were Substantial and
Prejudicial to the Extent that there is a Reasonable
Likelihood that in their Absence There Would Have
Been a More Favorable Result.

A. Standard of Review: In determining whether or not a
statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct:
The statement must be viewed in light of the
totality of the evidence presented at trial.
Further, because the trial court is in the best
position to determine the impact of a statement upon
the proceedings, its rulings on whether the
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
State

v.

Cummins,

839 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992).

B. Discussion: During the rebuttal portion of closing
arguments in this case, the prosecuting attorney, Mr. Mike
Christensen, made

comments

to the

18

jury which

incorrectly

stated the law.

During closing arguments of the defense,

defense counsel used a chart which set forth the elements of
first degree murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide and self
defense. This chart also included the state of mind which is
required for each offense. The chart explained that in order
to convict the defendant of first degree murder the jury must
find either, intent to kill, intent to do serious bodily
injury to another, or depraved indifference. (R. at 00162021). The chart went on to describe that in order to find the
defendant guilty of manslaughter one must find a reckless
disregard of the risk. Defense counsel then went on to read
the court's instruction of reckless disregard to the jury. (R.
at 001622) . The chart explained that to find the defendant
guilty

of

negligent

homicide

there

must

be

a

finding

a

criminal negligence. Defense counsel then went on to read the
court's instruction on criminal negligence to the jury. (R. at
001623).
Defense counsel then argued that if the jury decided that
the

defendant's

conduct

constituted

a

substantial

and

unjustifiable risk then they would have to decide between
manslaughter

and negligent homicide. Defense counsel then

explained to the jury that where there is potential mental
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illness or intoxication to the level that the defendant did
not know the risk or did not perceive the risk and the jury
finds it was a gross deviation for her not to realize that
risk then they should find the defendant guilty of negligent
homicide. (R. at 001625).
In

the

state's

rebuttal

argument

Mr.

Christensen

completely misstated the law as to voluntary intoxication and
how that would affect a verdict of manslaughter or negligent
homicide.

In

referring

to

the

defendant's

diagram,

the

following exchange took place:
Mr. Christensen:

Mr. Mooney fails on his diagram to
mention what voluntary intoxication
also does with regard to criminally
negligent types of homicide. Basically
it does away with negligent homicide
all together. Even when your read the
instruction on that- -

Mr. Mooney:

I am going to object to that, your Honor.

The Court:

Excuse me?

Mr. Mooney:

I am going to object. That's not the law.

Mr. Christensen:

On the contrary, it is.

The Court:

Your Objection?

Mr. Mooney:

My objection is the statement that's been
made, it misrepresents the law.

The Court

Members of the jury, as I have told you
before, arguments of counsel and statements
of counsel are not evidence in this matter.
20

You are to be governed by the law as
provided to you and as read to you. If your
interpretation of the law is different than
what Mr. Christensen is arguing to you, you
go by what is contained in the Jury
Instructions.
Mr. Christensen:

Let's clear that up. Jury Instruction
No. 18, I'll read it,

"Voluntary intoxication shall not be a
defense to a criminal charge unless such
intoxication negates the existence of the
mental state which is an element of the
offense. However, if recklessness --"
manslaughter here is recklessness — "or
criminal negligence establishes an element
of an offense and the actor is unaware of
the
risk
because
of
involuntary
intoxication, her awareness is immaterial
for the prosecution for that offense."
Again, ladies and gentlemen, I have
correctly stated the law to you. And
negligent
homicide
for
voluntary
intoxication doesn't apply. And the first
element of manslaughter, her recklessness
doesn't apply.
(R.

at

001651-52)1.

As

Mr.

Christensen

made

this

final

statement he took defendant's chart and crossed off first
"negligent

homicide"

"manslaughter"

and

and

its

it's

elements

elements.

In

and

other

secondly,
words,

the

prosecutions comments to the jury were that if they found that

1

Defense counsel objected to Jury Instruction No. 18 %%to the
extent that it indicates that intoxication can do away with the
awareness of the risk, to the distinction between reckless and
criminal negligence/' (R. at 001579).
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Ms- Longshaw was voluntarily intoxicated then they could not
find her guilty of either manslaughter or negligent homicide.
This was a clear misstatement of the law which was substantial
and prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in the absence of these statements there would
have been a more favorable result.
In State

v.

Valdez,

513 P.2d

422

(1973), the Supreme

Court of Utah established a two part test in reviewing alleged
prejudicial remarks of counsel. The first consideration is
whether or not the remarks call the attention of the jurors to
matters

they

determining

would
their

not

be

verdict.

justified
Once

this

in

considering

first

matter

in
is

established the court must then consider whether or not under
the particular

circumstances

of the case the jurors were

probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their
verdict. See

State

v. Valdez,

513 P.2d 422 (1973). This test

was more recently applied in the case of State
P.2d

848

(1992).

In that matter

v.

Cummins,

839

the court held that the

prosecution's statements constitute misconduct when:
The actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not
be justified in considering in determining its
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the
particular case, whether the error is substantial
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
22
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been a more favorable result.
Id.

at 852.
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clearly called the attention of the iurv *
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a matter, or legal

conclusion that they would not be J U S L I I I L J .n considering i n
determining their verdict. Mr. Christensen informed the jury
both prior to defense counsel's objection, and again after the
c o u r t' s i n s f, r i I c t j o n t h a t a r g i i m e n t o f c o i I n s e J i s i i E> t e v i d e n c eilf
that voluntary intoxication does away with the offenses of
nc.gnuei

.. . . . .4V. •. . ., '
"

. :s

i n a c c u r a t e statement o f t h e law. V o l u n t a r y i n t o x i c a t i o n is n o t
a defense to the crime of manslaughter or negligent homicide
and shall not be considered unless

the intoxication "negates

the existence of th^ mental state which is an element of the
o* ^ — • " I Jta h C( : P.2c

§ ; 6 2 30 6

1 (Utah 1992), the Supreme Court held that voluntary
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of tb<- mental stat^ which is an element of the offense. The
court fteld tiidt

i . i unis

defense

to

be

successful

xhe

defendant had to show more than that he had been drinking,
x

V[i]t was necessary to show that his mind had been affected to

s i i :: I I <E i I e x t e n t 1:1 I a It: 1 I = :! :i i i I • : It: I I a • = it: 1 i =
23

: a, p a c :i t:„.} * It: • : • f :

requisite specific intent or purpose" to commit the crime.
Wood at 90.
In the matter at hand Ms. Longshaw had not been drinking
prior to the funeral but had taken large quantities of Soma
and Valium that morning. During the trial in this matter Dr.
Steven N. Allen, who is a psychologist, testified as an expert
regarding, in part, Ms. Longshaw's mental state at the time of
the event. Regarding the substances that Ms. Longshaw has used
prior to the funeral he testified as follows:
Dr. Allen:

Ms. Longshaw said that she didn't care
about the funeral, about preparing for her
brother's funeral. She said that she didn't
dress and she didn't shower, which I take
as to be signs of extreme distress,
depression. She reported she hadn't been
drinking prior to the funeral, but she had
taken an estimated five or six Valium and
two or three Soma medications before the
funeral.

Ms. Lewis:

Could you describe taking five or six
Valium and two or three Soma, wrhat that
would do to a person?

Dr. Allen:

It would depend on the strength of the
Valium, but that's a significant dose of
Valium. That would likely significantly
impair somebody's judgment and functioning,
particularly if you combine that with Soma.

(R. at 0011151-52). Dr. Allen concluded by testifying that:
Based on all the information from the interview and
from the assessment measures, I think that her
mental state at the time of the shooting was
24

probably extremely distressed, I think she was
probably
thinking
very
poorly,
probably
was
significantly impaired by Valium and Soma use. I
think she was probably very distressed and depressed
at the time of the funeral.
:

Although Ms. Longshaw did not appear to tell anyone 011
the day of the funeral that she had been taking \ alium and
Soma her husband, Norman Longshaw, testified that he was aware
she had obtained these drugs prior to the funeral.
001502).

In

a d d i t :i « : »i 1

t : 1 1 :i :

I c>n g s h aw' s

(R. at

a i 1 < :i D i

A ]] eii s

testimony, the testimony from other witnesses regarding Ms.

someone using these types of drugs. Of particular importance
is tn^ testimony of Bonnie Thackeray, the assistant funeral
director. Ms. Thackeray testified that when Marlene had the
gun she appeared glassy eyed and that when Ms. Thackeray tried
to approach Mar leiu . md talk IM I KM
and

did

not

know

who

she was.

M m It in- did

(R. at

M M|

respond

000505-507
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Marlene's
laying

odd

behavior

throughout

that

„^K>„

w.jirjj to craw

day,

particularly

r,^_^

tuiKing to

her dead brother for the entire hour before the funeral,
supports the fact that she was taking Valium and Soma like she
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reported and was voluntarily intoxicated.
State
forth

v. Padilla,

the proper

intoxication.

776 P.2d 1329

reading

Like

of

Wood,

the

Padilla

(Utah 1989) also sets

law

regarding

explains

that

voluntary
although

voluntary intoxication is not a defense is can be considered
if the intoxication negates the existence of the mental state
which is an element of the offense. Although Ms. Longshaw
could not claim intoxication as a defense to manslaughter or
negligent homicide and ask that the jury find her not guilty
of these offenses based upon the fact she was intoxicated, the
fact that she may have been intoxicated does not prevent her
from further arguing that she may have also acted recklessly
or with criminal negligence as opposed to with premeditation
or depraved indifference. Further, the defendant clearly may
argue that because of her intoxication she was not able to
form

the

requisite

intent

of

premeditation

or

depraved

indifference and, in fact, her intoxication could serve as a
basis for finding that the charged offense was not proven
because

the

intent

was

not

present.

Mr.

Christensen's

statements to the jury, combined with him physically taking a
marker and crossing off manslaughter and negligent homicide
from defendant's state of mind exhibit, turned the law on its
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head, it wiuiiyiully I * MJ the juty h> Ujlifyt~> thai
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that Ms. Longshaw was voluntarily intoxicated, then they must
find her guilty 01 raider ii 1 tl le E 'irst Degree and not consider
the

lesser

recklessly

included
or

offenses

negligently

because

if

they

one

are

may

not

act

intoxicated.

£
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that the meaning of a Jury Instruction creates a result tnat
is contrary to tl le
854

sidL<

.

(Utah 1992) and State

. ,

v. Andreason,

-

-^;,

-

718 P.2d 400 (Utah

1986) . Clearly the first prong of the test set forth in

State

hand.
Secondly,
prosecutor's

on^^

it

has

remarks call to

be e n
LIIO

GS

LciLii^i.t

attention of the jury a

matter it would not be justified in considering 3 n determining

error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a
1 e a s o 1 i a b 1 e J i k e ] :i 1 1 • > • i 1 1 1 a t: :i 1 :i ii t s a b s e n • : • • =

t h e 1:

E
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been a more favorab.e result. Under the facts of the case at
hana m e r e u_. a SL- ..... I iJ i.-lihuud Lliai 111

I

I

in 1

11 1 In'

prosecutor's remarks there would have been a more favorable
result. In determining whether or not argument was prejudicial
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this

Court

should

"consider

circumstances of the case." State
(Utah 1986). In Andreason,

the
v.

entire

Andreason,

record

and

718 P.2d 400

the Supreme Court ruled that "[i]f

proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, we will not presume
the improper remark to be prejudicial. But in a case with less
than compelling proof, we will more closely scrutinize the
prosecutor's conduct." Id.

In the matter at hand the issue was

not whether or not Ms. Longshaw shot Mr. Stewart, but what her
mental state was and under what circumstances she had shot
him. The defense in this case was that she was not guilty of
first degree murder but was guilty of either manslaughter or
negligent homicide because of her mental state, or that she
was acting in self defense. The evidence presented by the
state that Ms. Longshaw acted with either intent to commit
murder, intent to commit serious bodily harm, or with depraved
indifference was almost non existent as will be discussed in
more detail below. The evidence at trial did show that Ms.
Longshaw was suffering from a mental illness, was intoxicated
and was under extreme emotional distress at the time of the
shooting. The evidence showed that although she may have acted
negligently, and possibly recklessly she never acted with the
intent to kill or to do serious bodily injury or with depraved
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,

ability to recognize the effect of the mental state and *u
convict her oi either manslaughter or negligent homicide. Tne
facts left little question that Ms. Longshaw was in a state 01
voluntary intoxication. The State even argued that this was
the case

Tl le rep^ w •

jury

believe

tc

• --'----' j mprcr- >•

that

.;,i •

": '

they

found

^ ;.:,-._. ^.- L- i .. ...

M s . Longshaw

I: 1 , :i c t 1 i- E i: of ei tl lei

of these lesser offenses w h e n in fact, v o l u n t a r y
is

a potential

defense

to E 'irst

was

Degree

intoxication

murder.

Given the

evidence at trial a iurv b e l i e v i n g that voluntary intoxication
negates

manslaughter

degree

murder.

c o i [ ip 1 e t e 1 y

or negligent

Because

the

a i i • :i i i I c c r i e c 11 y

homicide

prosecutor's

would

b e left

misstatements

i i e g a t e d M s . L o n g s h a w' s d e f e n s e ,

combined w i t h t h e lack of evidence that supported a conviction
o-;

Liist

d e g r e e m u r d e r , i it: is c l e a r that t h e statements w e r e

prejudicial a n d that without them there is a strong likelihood
that M s . Longshaw would have been

reverse

the conviction

entered

matter,
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convicted

in t:v

of one ~ ^

: rial c o u r t

x

~"1_ ~

in this

II.

There Was Insufficient Evidence Upon Which to
Convict the Defendant of Criminal Homicidef Murder,
a First Degree Felony.

A. Standard of Review: When examining the sufficiency of
the evidence in a criminal jury trial the threshold issue of
statutory interpretation is decided as a matter of law.
State

v.

Souza,

See

846 P.2d at 1313 (Utah App. 1993). With regard

to the facts, the evidence and all inferences which may be
reasonably

drawn

from it are

reviewed

in the

light most

favorable to the verdict of the jury. This Court will review
a conviction when the evidence, viewed in light of the court's
interpretation of the statute, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently

improbable

that

reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which she was convicted. See

State

v.

Johnson,

821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992).
B. Discussion: Ms. Longshaw was convicted of one count of
Criminal Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony. First Degree
Murder is defined at Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 7 6-5-203 which sets

forth the elements which must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt in order for the defendant to be convicted. Section 765-203 reads in relevant part that:
(1) Criminal
actor:

homicide

30

constitutes

murder

if the

( a / J. 11 L e n t J v
of another;
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(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury *<>
another commits an act clearly dangerous
human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another
and thereby
causes
the death
:f
another;
The trial court instructed the jury as 1 , the definition
intentionally" ^n - 'knuw^ng^
court

further

instructed

serious bodily injury.
Inst" r ur<t i -

''I 1 1

the iurv as L ^ L ^ u^finition ^1

(R. at 000142, 000143). Also, in Jury
^ ji 11 t d ^ f i n o d " d e p r a v e d

indifference"

as follows:
(1) tl 1a t tl le defendant acted knowingly
(2) 11 1
creating a grave risk of death (3) knowing that the
risk of death was grave, (4) which means a highly
likely probability of death, and (5) that the
conduct
evidenced
an utter
callousness and
indifference towards human .1 i fe
(R. at 000144). The court further instructed that:
k

'Depraved niuiiieienue
nieaiib d.. u n t i udiiuubntbb
toward the value of human life and complete and
total indifference as to whether one's conduct will
create a grave risk of death to another. Thu^, <
<
finding of depraved indifference must be based on an
objective evaluation of the magnitude of the risk
created and of all the circumstances surrounding the
death. That: evaluation should focus on the gravity
of the ri sk to human life that is created, the
callousness of attitude toward that risk, and the
lack of justification for the creation of the risk
in the first place. In evaluating the evidence, the
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jury should consider the following factors: (1) the
utility of the defendant's conduct which caused the
death; (2) the magnitude of the risk created by the
defendant's conduct; (3) the defendant's knowledge
of the risk; and (4) any precaution taken by the
defendant to minimize the risk.
(R. at 000145) . The prosecution argued during closing that all
of

the

elements

"Intentional,

of

knowing,

first

degree

depraved

murder

were

indifference,

present.

intentional

infliction of serious bodily injury." (R. at 001654). The fact
is that the evidence did not show any of these elements to be
present, but rather showed that the defendant was acting under
extreme emotional distress and voluntary intoxication. The
evidence

at

trial

showed

that

the

defendant

was

either

negligent or reckless or acting in self defense, but the
evidence did not support a verdict of intent to kill, commit
serious bodily injury or acting with depraved indifference.
Utah

Code Ann.

§ 76-5-205 sets forth the definition for

manslaughter and reads in pertinent part that:
(1)
Criminal
homicide
constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of
another; or
(b) causes the death of another under
the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse; or
(c) causes the death of another under
circumstances
where
the
actor
reasonably believes the circumstances
32

provide a regal jusniication
or
excuse for his conduct although the
conduct is not legally justifiable or
excusable
undei
3x i s t i n g
circumstances.

(^) Under Subsecti^ii
\±) \±.,,
cniotioilal
d i s t u r b a n c e does not i n c l u d e a c o n d i t i o n
r e s u l t i n g from mental i l l n e s s as defined in
S e c t i o n 76-2-305.
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or
e x c u s e under S u b s e c t i o n (l)(b), o r t h e
reasonable belief o f the actor
under
Subsection (1 ) (c), shall be determined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable person u n d e r
the then existing c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
(4) M a n s1a i i gh t e r i s a fe ] o ny of t he sec ond
degree.
Utah

Code Ann.

§ 7 6-5-2 0 7 sets

forth the e l e m e n t s

for the

crime of n e g l i g e n t homicide and states that:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
n e g l i g e n c e , causes the d e a t h of a n o t h e r .
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A
misdemeanor.
11 3 reviewii ig 11 Ie evidence presented at tria1 i t is clear
that the evidence did not support the verdict iii this case.
There was no evidence that "Marlene intended to kill anyone or
even intended to commit serious bodJ '

evidence d o e s n o t support a finding oi d e p r a v e d
J : a the i
disturbance,
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mental
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illness
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a n d intoxication
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which
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led to

>ere w a s a l s o e v i d e n c e t h a t

Marlene was fearful for herself and her family and may have
been acting in self defense.
Almost
Marlene

every

Longshaw

witness
was

in

this

acting

matter

under

testified

extreme

that

emotional

disturbance the day of the shooting. Daniel Hernandez, the
funeral director testified that Marlene was laying on top of
the body of her brother Aaron for the entire hour prior to the
shooting. He testified that this behavior was out of the
ordinary and she appeared to be very upset. (R. at 000297-98).
Bonnie Thackeray, the assistant funeral director testified
that Marlene was glassy eyed and did not seem to know who Ms.
Thackeray was when she approached her. (R. at 000506). Dorothy
Greuber, Marlene's mother, testified that Marlene was not only
laying on her brother's body but when she tried to get her off
the body Marlene said "no mom, just put me in with him and
close the casket so I can go with him." (R. at 001107). Lane
Larson testified that Marlene was also kissing Aaron and that
he had never seen her act this way before. That she was "very
very very upset" (R. at 001225) . He testified that when he
tried to comfort Marlene she kept asking her dead brother to
just give her one more kiss and it was as though she did not
even

know Mr. Larson was

there.
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(R. at

001226) . Terresa

breuoer testified that when she arrived at: the funeral she saw
M a r l e n e and that Marlene was l o o k i n g dazed and out of it. (R.
at, u u i ^ b w j .

Tamara Nelson

Marlene

laying

was

"Marlene

wasn't

over

a] 1

confirmed
the

there.

in ner

casket
She

and

was

testimony

also

very

stated

distraught

that
that
and

M i k e M o o r e t e s t i f i e d that In t w e n t y years of k n o w i n g M a r l e n e
:-

;:.;.

ikr^j:

b-_t_:. :. . d^

_e\ ~L

•_ i:.

seen

;.ei

ij:e

she

was the day of this funeral. (R. at 0 0 1 3 5 8 - 5 9 ) . Alicia Patrick
t e s t i f i e d that M a r l e n e w a s

x

[v ]ery s t r e s s e d . She just w a s n ' t

t h e r e . W e could not get h e r to t a l k or a n y t h i n g . She

just

w a n t e d to lay on A a r o n . T h a t ' s all she w a n t e d to do.'' (P. at
: :)] 3 9 9 )

-r.

-

-

•.

•

-.

-•

-

• • . ,.L. ,

M a r l e n e off the casket but was u n s u c c e s s f u l and that M a r l e n e
kept

s a y :i i i • g
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N o r m a n L o n g s h a w testified that M a r l e n e had b e e n a basket case
since

discovering

her

brother's

body.

(R.

at

001483)

He

further t e s t i f i e d that she had n o t b o t h e r e d to c l e a n h e r s e l f
up for the funeral and w a s w e a r i n g the same c l o t h e s she had
the day be fore

(I \

'

H 1 R f.)

T h e t e s t i m o n y <.f the w i t n e s s e s at
11 i a t

M s . I o i Ig s 1 Iaw

-
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t r i a l m a d e it c l e a r
^ L r u i: L e

emotional

(

)

distress the day of the funeral. This evidence was combined
with that of Dr. Allen who testified that Ms. Longshaw also
suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and possibly from
Borderline Personality Disorder.

Dr. Allen, who specializes

in working with patients who suffer from Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder testified that based upon his clinical interview and
the administration of the MMPI II, the Pennsylvania Inventory
and the Shipley-Hartford Inventory that he had diagnosed Ms.
Longshaw with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"). (R. at
001134-35).

Dr. Allen testified that Marlene had a history of

very traumatic experiences prior to the death of her brother.
At age fourteen Ms. Longshaw was raped. Rape is very commonly
associated with PTSD even when it happened some fifteen years
prior. (R. at 001146). Ms. Longshaw had also suffered from the
death of her father and more recently the death of her younger
sister. (R. at 001147). In fact, Aaron's funeral was on the
one year

anniversary

date of her

sister's

death.

(R. at

001148). Ms. Longshaw also witnessed a murder in 1977 and was
shot

at

at

that

time.

(R.

at

001149).

Dr.

Allen

also

considered that Ms. Longshaw had been in a fight with a gang
when she broke up a fight between her son and another boy in
1994 and later the boy's mother's boyfriend attempted to stab
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scored considerably higher than Vietnam veterans who suffer
from m e disorder

rpic^ily

score

(&

usual

score on the Penn Inventory Test for a Vietnam veteran is 54
whereas Ms. Longshaw scored a 60. (R. at 001136)

Dr Allen

t e sti fi ed

11 i a 1: 1: »e s :i de s ] oo k i n g a t t: r ai in ia t :i : e ve n 1: s h e a ] s c >

took

consideration

j

into

:

M s . Longshaw's

•.
-

-«

account

o f feeling

-

about her spiritual life. Further she had troubling nightmares
and felt confused about her m ^ . these are further symptoms
of PTSD.
n

^. Allen also testified that Ms. Longshaw possessed many

of the characfer'r*-

- rx ^

ir~i-^r

p--. ~
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:r~^^r

w a s u n a b l e , h o w e v e r , t o c o n c l u s i v e l y d i a g n o s e this
I: -i I t f• E J t :i t ; ; c .s s o n L = • 1:1 :i :i i lg tl ia I: i leeded

disorder

t : 1: = J • : : •] : = ::i :i i I I :

m o r e d e t a i l . H e testified h o w e v e r , that M a r l e n e suffered

from

i nai ly • : f tl n E • z\ laracter is tics o f this disorder Including frantic
efforts

to a n individuals

real

or imagined

abandonment;

patterns o f unstable and intense interpersonal

relationships

characterized b y a 1 t• = rnat:ii i i :j ] :>etween extremes c f :i dea 1 i zatj on
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and devaluation; identity disturbance and unstable self image;
impulsivity in two areas that are potentially self-damaging
including

substance

abuse;

recurrent

suicidal

behaviors;

instability due to marked reactivity of mood; chronic feelings
of emptiness and transient stress-related paranoid ideation
and severe paranoid symptoms, (R. at 001192-96).
Although

emotional

disturbance

does

not

include

condition resulting from mental illness as defined in
Code

Ann.

§

76-2-305

when

a

mental

condition

leads

a

Utah
to

emotional disturbance this should be considered in determining
whether

or

not

the

manslaughter. In State

defendant
v. Bishop,

committed

the

crime

753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), in

her concurrence, Justice Durham stated that:
Grief and post-traumatic shock syndrome are
only two examples of internal mental or
emotional
conditions
that
can
cause
emotional disturbance leading to violent
actions. The emotional disturbance is not
triggered by external stimuli, but by
internal mental states which may or may not
have reasonable explanation or' excuse and
which may or may not raise to the level
necessary to sustain a diminished capacity
defense. Other examples of subjective
mental or emotional conditions which could
and should be relevant to a manslaughter
analysis are sleep deprivation, medication
imbalance, severe anxiety (not amounting to
mental illness) and physical illness. These
conditions may bring
about
emotional
disturbance-leading to loss of self-control
38
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finding under certain facts.
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manslaughter

griei ./JI lered by Ms

Longshaw, combined

with the PTSD the symptoms of Borderline Personality Disorder
and

t h e voluntary

intoxication

discussed

emotional disturbance which lead
this

emotional

disturbance
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past which lead t
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above,
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caused an

under
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- brother,
under

a degree

degree

I i iqsli, J

s

; diagnosis of PTSD, combined with being

her emotional

disturbance

the circumstances.

w a s more

T h e evidence

matter is sufficiently inconclusive iri J -' -~-~c^ •

reasonab] e

the

.cuiij h^r b r o m e r ' s ooay and the normal stress of

reasonable
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--^br-p f

that reasonable m i n d s must
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murder.

If
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jury

have

::<:: >n: u i: i :i t be • :l

would

cc >i 1 sider atioi I t : • ti iese fac toi: s 11 i.ey

in this
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entertained •::

t i r = • ::i: :i i i: \£ • • : f

have

than

given

f:i i : s t

proper

cou 1 d i Io t: have reasonably

convicted M s . Longshaw of first degree m u r d e r and therefore
this Court should overturn the verdict of the jury.
There

w a s also

evidence

presented

supported a verdict of either negligent homicide or not guilty
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four witnesses that Terry Stewart was seen with a gun at the
viewing the night prior to the funeral. (R. at 001100, 001379,
001396 and 001425) . Further, there was evidence

from two

witnesses that they believed they saw a gun on Stewart the day
of the funeral. Tamara Nelson stated that she saw the gun and
Rhonda Larson testified that she saw Stewart reach into his
coat and she believed he was reaching for a gun. (R. at 001290
and 001329). Dr. Allen testified that Marlene reported to him
that she was in fear for her life and that of her families
because of the threats and what had happened the night before.
He further testified that these appeared to be reasonable
fears under the circumstances. (R. at 001151). Marlene also
reported to him that when the fight broke out at the funeral
home she believed that "gangs were coming to kill us." (R. at
001153) . All of these statements support a theory of self
defense. Lane Larson testified that when the gun went off
Marlene had a hold of Stewart's jacket and was trying to break
up the fight. (R. at 001233). This evidence supports an act of
negligent homicide or accidental shooting.
Even though the evidence in this matter was overwhelming
that

Ms.

Longshaw

was

suffering

from

extreme

emotional

disturbance along with strong evidence of negligent homicide
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circumstantial,

with

depraved

w 1 Ia t s o ev e r , d i re c t

:• i:

that Marlene went to the funeral with the

intent to kill anyone. There was no evidence that when the
fight broke out and Marlene took out the gun that she intended
tc kill or injure anyone. The only evidence that Marlene even
appear *-n
from Daniel Hernandez who was not even in *:.•- room at the Lime
: f tl ie actual si IOC "
appeared to be aimin<
Stewar"

:•::..;.:•;'.

*:-:_.._: >*_-

y

. t he direction r.i

at 000321

ana w JLO^- L
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~ :IL Sloan and Terry
iere

was no

other

evidence that Marlene may have been intending to shoot anyone.
There was however evidence that she was merely attempting to
brea} :: i IJ: tl r = f j ::]1 i It: 1: • = tween 1 ler 1: r otl ler ai i< :1 TCE rr \7 Stev/a r t: The
state absolutely did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
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The state also did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that M s , Longshaw acted with depraved indirterence.

Tr

to prove

t : prove

depraved

indifference

11

the state

needed

^ order

beyond a reasonable doubt that Marlene acted knowingly in
creating a grave risk of death, knowing that the risk of death
was grave, which means a highly likely probability of death,
and

that

the

conduct

evidenced

an utter

callousness

and

indifference towards human life. Knowingly, or with knowledge
is defined at Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-2-103(2) which states that:

A person engages in conduct:
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances, A person acts knowingly, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result.
The state in this matter did not put forth evidence which
proved that Marlene acted knowingly in creating a grave risk
of death, knowing that the risk of death was great and in
order to prove depraved indifference murder the state must
prove both

this and

that

the

conduct

evidenced

an utter

callousness and indifference towards human life. There was not
any evidence at trial in this matter that suggested Marlene
acted knowing that she was creating a grave risk of death when
she took the gun out at the funeral. Even the two neutral
witnesses in the case, Daniel Hernandez, and Bonnie Thackeray
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.oove, both of these

witnesses testified that Marlene appeared to be under extreme
en LC t:i oi ia ] d i s tr ess at 11 ie timc 01 int shooting. Ms. Thackeray
testified that she heard Marlene say "back off" two or three
times and that she appeared to be trying to stop the fight
between her brother and Stewart.
testified
taken

i

(»mr^)

^lv

H-

that she tried to approach Marlene after she had
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fining

the g u n , h o w e v e r ,

this

t e s t i m o n y m u s t b e tv-ken w i t h a g r a i n of salt since he furtVi-~%'
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shooting took place.

• ii

+

che r o o m m i n u t e s

before

(R. a t 0 0 0 ? / r

•v

the a c t u a l
:

~^

was ample evidence that Marlene was not aiming the gun and was
desperately t r :
Stewart.

^nu

(See testimony of Lane Larson at 001222-001252). 2
ra^p-

associated

with

depraved

Kusse^

indifference

/* (Utah 1987-

first

^:^i

..

degree

murder

was

^ffirme*

2

....

^ypically

murder.

-~ which

In

State

a verdict

" i « •<' Stet- ,.-i i I

for
I

Mr. Larson''s testimony IJL> VX.XJ V X ^ example ui m e idci r:^t
Marlene Longshaw was not attempting to shoot anybody. There are
other examples of this from virtually every witness.
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concurrence
indifference.

goes
In

to

some

length

discussing

the

in

defining

history

of

depraved
depraved

indifference murder Justice Stewart states that:
A third category of murder was sometimes
called depraved-heart murder. This label
derived
from
decisions
and
statutes
condemning as murder unintentional homicide
under circumstances evincing a "depraved
mind" or an "abandoned and malignant
heart."
Older
authorities
may
have
described such circumstances as giving rise
to an "implied" or "presumed" intent to
kill or injure, but the essential concept
was one of extreme recklessness regarding
homicidal risk. Thus, a person might be
liable for murder absent any actual intent
to kill or injure if he caused the death of
another in a manner exhibiting a "wanton
and wilful disregard of an unreasonable
human risk" or, in confusing elaboration,
a "wickedness of disposition, hardness of
heart,
cruelty,
recklessness . of
consequences, and a mind regardless of
social duty."
It is this latter definition which emphasizes a "wickedness of
disposition" which has been most commonly associated with
depraved
discuss

indifference murder.

Justice

that the facts of the Russell

Stewart went
case were

on to

such to

support a verdict of murder based upon depraved indifference.
The defendant told Floyd and LaRue [the
victims], "If I don't start getting some
answers, I am going to start blowing
everybody away." He pointed his gun at
Floyd and when Floyd attempted to move it
away, he shot Floyd once in the chin. He
44

then ran outside, and when LaRue went back
in the house, he shot at her through the
window. He also testified that he knew the
gun was a dangerous weapon and was aware of
the probable result if someone were to
shoot another in the face.
State

v.

Russell,

opinion).

733

P.2d

The Court in Utah v.

162

(Utah

Frame,

1987){concurring

723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986)

also upheld a conviction for murder under the circumstances
where the defendant and the victim were engaged in shooting
practice and got into a fight. The defendant dove into the
fight with a knife in hand, kicked the victim in the head with
steel toe boots and when the victim attempted to get up off
the ground kicked him in the chest and face. After stabbing
the

victim

the

defendant

fled

the

scene

and

was

not

of situations where

the

apprehended until later.
These

are

just two examples

defendant clearly acted knowing they were creating a grave
risk

of

death

which

evidenced

an

utter

callousness

and

indifference towards human life. This is clearly not the case
at hand. See

also

State

v.

Garcia,

663 P. 2d 60 (Utah 1983)

(defendant beat victim in head with blunt object and stabbed
victim fifteen times during a fight); State

v.

Fontana,

680

P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984) (drive by shooting in which witnesses
saw defendant tailgating victim in threatening manner, revving
45

his engine and almost hitting victim prior to shooting.) and
State

v.

Gardner,

844 P.2d 293 (Utah 1992) (defendant kicked

victim in the face after victim kissed defendant and then took
the victim's personal property and when victim attempted to
get up defendant continued kicking him in the neck and head
causing his death.). The evidence did not show that Marlene
Longshaw knowingly created a grave risk of death. There was
not evidence presented that Marlene was
of

her

conduct

or

the

existing

aware of the nature

circumstances

when

she

attempted to stop the fight between her brother and Terry
Stewart. There was not any evidence that Marlene was aware
that her conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result
that it did. The state attempted to argue that the mere act of
taking

out

a

gun

in

a

public

place

evidences

depraved

indifference but this is not necessarily the case and the
state must prove more than this to show that the defendant
acted with depraved indifference beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence at trial showed that Marlene was acting under
extreme emotional distress, that she was in a daze and really
had

no

idea

what

she

was

doing.

The

evidence

further

established that Marlene did not even know that she had killed
anyone until she was told this by Officer Gallagher during his
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interview of her at the station after the funeral. (R. at
001077).
The evidence in this case does not support a verdict of
first degree murder under intent to kill, intent to commit
serious bodily injury or depraved indifference. The evidence
on these issues was sufficiently inconclusive and inherently
improbable

to

a

degree

that

reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of murder in the first degree. The evidence was
overwhelming

that

the

defendant

was

acting

under

severe

emotional distress and that this distress was reasonable under
the

circumstances.

Further,

there

was

ample

evidence

to

support a verdict of negligent homicide or that the defendant
was acting in self defense and was therefore not guilty.
CONCLUSION
During closing arguments the prosecutor misstated the law
calling the attention of the jurors to a matter that they were
not

justified

in

considering.

This

misstatement

was

prejudicial and it is likely that there would have been a more
favorable result in its absence. Further, the evidence in this
matter was insufficient to support a verdict of murder in the
first degree and reasonable minds must have entertained a
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reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. This
matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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